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Abstract—We consider a wireless communication system,
where a transmitter sends signals to a receiver with different
modulation types while the receiver classifies the modulation
types of the received signals using its deep learning-based
classifier. Concurrently, an adversary transmits adversarial per-
turbations using its multiple antennas to fool the classifier into
misclassifying the received signals. From the adversarial machine
learning perspective, we show how to utilize multiple antennas
at the adversary to improve the adversarial (evasion) attack
performance. Two main points are considered while exploiting the
multiple antennas at the adversary, namely the power allocation
among antennas and the utilization of channel diversity. First, we
show that multiple independent adversaries, each with a single
antenna cannot improve the attack performance compared to
a single adversary with multiple antennas using the same total
power. Then, we consider various ways to allocate power among
multiple antennas at a single adversary such as allocating power
to only one antenna, and proportional or inversely proportional
to the channel gain. By utilizing channel diversity, we introduce
an attack to transmit the adversarial perturbation through the
channel with the largest channel gain at the symbol level. We
show that this attack reduces the classifier accuracy significantly
compared to other attacks under different channel conditions in
terms of channel variance and channel correlation across anten-
nas. Also, we show that the attack success improves significantly
as the number of antennas increases at the adversary that can
better utilize channel diversity to craft adversarial attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in deep learning (DL) have enabled nu-
merous applications in different domains such as computer
vision [1] and speech recognition [2]. Upon the success of
these applications, DL has been also applied to wireless
communications where the high-dimensional spectrum data is
analyzed by deep neural networks (DNNs) while accounting
for unique characteristics of the wireless medium such as
waveform, channel, interference, and traffic effects [3]–[5].
Examples of wireless communication applications that benefit
from DL include waveform design [5], spectrum sensing [6],
and signal classification [3].
Despite the benefits of DL, DNNs are known to be suscepti-
ble to adversarial manipulation of their input causing incorrect
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outputs such as classification labels as demonstrated first in
computer vision applications [7]. Therefore, machine learning
in the presence of adversaries has received significant attention
in the computer vision domain and has been extensively
studied in the context of adversarial machine learning [8].
Different types of attacks built upon adversarial machine
learning are feasible in wireless communication systems such
as exploratory attacks [9], adversarial attacks [10], poisoning
attacks [11], membership inference attacks [12], and Trojan
attacks [13]. These attacks have the advantage of being
stealthier than conventional jamming attacks that typically add
interference directly to data transmissions without specifically
targeting the underlying machine learning applications [14].
In this paper, we focus on adversarial attacks (also known
as evasion attacks) which correspond to adding small pertur-
bations to the original input of the DNNs in order to cause
misclassification. These perturbations are not just random but
are carefully crafted to fool the DNNs. Adversarial attacks
on modulation classifier [3] of wireless signals have been
studied in [10] where fast gradient method (FGM) [15] is
used to create adversarial perturbations. In [16]–[18], it has
been shown that the modulation classifier is vulnerable to
various forms of adversarial attacks in the AWGN channel.
Adversarial attacks in the presence of realistic channel effects
and broadcast transmissions have been studied in [19], [20].
The attack setting has been also extended to incorporate
communication error performance [21] and covertness [22].
Our goal in this paper is to investigate the use of multiple
antennas to generate multiple concurrent perturbations over
different channel effects (subject to a total power budget) to
the input of a DNN-based modulation classifier at a wireless
receiver. This problem setting is different from computer
vision applications of adversarial attacks that are limited to
a single perturbation that can be directly added to the DNN’s
input without facing uncertainties such as channel effects. We
assume that the adversary has multiple antennas to transmit
adversarial perturbations in the presence of realistic channel
effects and aims to decrease the accuracy of a modulation clas-
sifier. As shown in [19], transmitting random (e.g., Gaussian)
noise to decrease the accuracy of the classifier at the receiver is
ineffective as an adversarial attack, since random noise cannot
manipulate the input to the DNN in a specific direction as
needed in an adversarial attack. Therefore, increasing the per-
turbation power with random noise transmitted over multiple
antennas remains ineffective. Instead, the adversary needs to
carefully craft the adversarial perturbation for each antenna.
We design a white-box attack where the adversary knows
the receiver’s classifier architecture, input at the receiver,
and the channel between the adversary and the receiver. The
adversary signal is time-aligned with the transmitted signal
and uses the maximum received perturbation power (MRPP)
attack that was introduced in [19]. First, we show that just
increasing the number of individual adversaries with single
antennas (located at different positions) does not improve the
attack performance. Next, we consider the use of multiple
antennas at a single adversary and propose different methods
to allocate power among antennas at the adversary and to
exploit the channel diversity. We first propose a genie-aided
adversarial attack where the adversary selects one antenna to
transmit the perturbation such that it would result in the worst
classification performance depending on the channel condition
over the entire symbol block (that corresponds to the input to
the DNN at the receiver). Then, we consider transmitting with
all the antennas at the adversary where the power allocation is
based on the channel gains, either proportional or inversely
proportional to the channel gains. However, these attacks
remain ineffective. We propose the elementwise maximum
channel gain (EMCG) attack to utilize the channel diversity
more efficiently by selecting the antenna with the best channel
gain at the symbol level to transmit perturbations.
We show that the EMCG attack outperforms other attacks
and effectively uses channel diversity provided by multiple
antennas to cause misclassification at the receiver. This attack
improvement remains effective regardless of the channel vari-
ance or correlation between channels, whereas the proportional
to the channel gain (PCG) attack is greatly affected by the cor-
relation between channels. Finally, we show that increasing the
number of antennas at the adversary significantly improves the
attack performance by better exploiting the channel diversity
to craft and transmit adversarial perturbations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides the system model. Section III introduces adversarial
attacks using multiple antennas. Section IV presents simulation
results. Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless communication system that consists
of a transmitter, a receiver, and an adversary as shown in Fig.
1. Both the transmitter and the receiver are equipped with
a single antenna. The receiver uses a pre-trained DL-based
classifier on the received signals to classify the modulation
type that is used at the transmitter. The adversary has m
antennas to launch a white-box adversarial attack to cause
misclassification at the receiver. The white-box attack can be
considered as an upper-bound for other attacks with limited
information. The assumptions on the knowledge of the adver-
sary can be relaxed as shown in [19].
The DNN classifier at the receiver is denoted by f(·; θ) :
X → RC , where θ is the set of parameters of the DNN decided
in the training phase and C is the number of modulation types.
Note X ⊂ Cp, where p is the dimension of the complex-
valued I/Q (in-phase/quadrature) inputs to the DNN that can
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Fig. 1. System model.
also be represented by concatenation of two real-valued inputs.
A modulation type lˆ(x, θ) = argmaxk fk(x, θ) is assigned by
f to input x ∈ X . In this formulation, fk(x, θ) is the output
of classifier f corresponding to the kth modulation type.
The channel from the transmitter to the receiver is htr,
and the channel from the ith antenna of the adversary to the
receiver is hari , where htr = [htr,1, htr,2, · · ·, htr,p]T ∈ Cp×1
and hari = [hari,1, hari,2, · · ·, hari,p]T ∈ Cp×1. If the
transmitter transmits x, the receiver receives rt = Htrx+n,
if there is no adversarial attack, or receives ra = Htrx +∑m
i=1 Hariδi + n, if the adversary transmits the perturbation
signal δi at the ith antenna, where Htr = diag{htr,1, · ·
·, htr,p} ∈ Cp×p,Hari = diag{hari,1, · · ·, hari,p} ∈ Cp×p,
δi ∈ Cp×1 and n ∈ Cp×1 is complex Gaussian noise. For
a stealth attack, the adversarial perturbations on antennas are
constrained as
∑m
i=1 ‖δi‖22 ≤ Pmax for some suitable power
Pmax. To determine these perturbations with respect to the
transmitted signal x from the transmitter, the adversary solves
the following optimization problem.
argmin
{δi}
m∑
i=1
‖δi‖22
subject to lˆ(rtr, θ) 6= lˆ(rari(δi), θ), i = 1, 2, ...,m
m∑
i=1
‖δi‖22 ≤ Pmax. (1)
In (1), the objective is to minimize the perturbation power
subject to two constraints where the receiver misclassifies
the received signal and the budget for perturbation power
is not exceeded. However, solving optimization problem (1)
is difficult because of the inherent structure of the DNN.
Thus, different methods have been proposed to approximate
the adversarial perturbation. For instance, FGM is a compu-
tationally efficient method for generating adversarial attacks
by linearizing the loss function of the DNN classifier. We
denote the loss function of the model by L(θ,x,y), where
y ∈ {0, 1}C is the one-hot encoded class vector. Then, FGM
linearizes this loss function in a neighborhood of x and uses
this linearized function for optimization. Since the adversary
uses more than one antenna, the adversary needs to utilize the
diversity of channels to craft more effective perturbations. For
that purpose, we introduce different approaches in Section III.
III. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS USING MULTIPLE ANTENNAS
In this section, we introduce different methods to utilize
multiple antennas at the adversary to improve the attack perfor-
Algorithm 1: PCG attack with common target
Inputs: input rtr, desired accuracy εacc, power constraint
Pmax and model of the classifier L(θ, ·, ·)
Initialize: ε← 0C×1, wi = ‖hari‖2∑m
j=1 ‖harj‖2
, i = 1, · · · ,m
for class-index c in range(C) do
εmax ←
√
Pmax, εmin ← 0
for i = 1 to m do
δci =
H
∗
ari
∇xL(θ,rtr,y
c)
(‖H∗ari∇xL(θ,rtr,y
c)‖2)
end
while εmax − εmin > εacc do
εavg ← (εmax + εmin)/2
xadv ← x− εavg
∑m
i=1 wiHariδ
c
i
if lˆ(xadv) == ltrue then εmin ← εavg
else εmax ← εavg
end
ε[c] = εmax
end
target = argmin ε, δi = ε[target]wiδ
target
i for ∀i
mance. Note that the adversary can allocate power differently
to each antenna and increase the channel diversity by using
multiple antennas. Throughout the paper, we apply the targeted
MRPP attack in [19] to generate an attack at the adversary.
The MRPP attack searches over all modulation types to cause
misclassification at the receiver and chooses one modulation
type that needs the least power to cause the misclassification.
A. Single-Antenna Genie-Aided (SAGA) Attack
We first begin with an attack where the adversary allocates
all the power to only one antenna for the entire symbol block
of an input to the classifier at the receiver as shown in Fig.
2(a). In this attack, we assume that the adversary is aided by
a Genie and thus knows in advance the best antenna out of
m antennas that causes a misclassification. Then, the Genie-
aided adversary puts all the power to that one specific antenna
to transmit adversarial perturbation.
B. Proportional to Channel Gain (PCG) Attack
To exploit the channel with the better channel gain, the
adversary allocates more power to better channels. Specifi-
cally, the power allocation for the ith antenna is proportional
to the channel gain ‖hari‖2. The adversarial perturbation that
is transmitted by each antenna is generated using the MRPP
attack as before and transmitted with the power allocated
to each antenna. During the attack generation process, the
adversary can set the common target modulation type of
misclassification (each perturbation aims to cause misclassi-
fication of signals to a common target label) or independent
target (each perturbation aims to cause misclassification of
signals to its own target label) for each antenna.
1) PCG attack with common target: The adversary sets
a common target modulation type for all antennas to cause
specific misclassification at the receiver. The adversary deter-
mines the common target modulation type which needs the
Algorithm 2: PCG attack with independent targets
Inputs: input rtr, desired accuracy εacc, power constraint
Pmax and model of the classifier L(θ, ·, ·)
Initialize: ε← 0C×1, wi = ‖hari‖2∑m
j=1 ‖harj ‖2
, i = 1, · · · ,m
for i = 1 to m do
for class-index c in range(C) do
εmax ←
√
Pmax, εmin ← 0
δci =
H
∗
ari
∇xL(θ,rtr,y
c)
(‖H∗ari
∇xL(θ,rtr,yc)‖2)
while εmax − εmin > εacc do
εavg ← (εmax + εmin)/2
xadv ← x− εavg
∑m
i=1 wiHariδ
c
i
if lˆ(xadv) == ltrue then εmin ← εavg
else εmax ← εavg
end
end
ε[c] = εmax
target = argmin ε, δi = ε[target]wiδ
target
i
end
least power to fool the receiver. The details are presented in
Algorithm 1.
2) PCG attack with independent targets: For the ith an-
tenna, the adversary decides the individual target modulation
type for perturbation δi. Each antenna independently chooses
the target modulation type which uses the least power to cause
misclassification at the receiver. These modulation types may
differ from each other. By setting individual target modulation
type for each antenna, the adversary can exploit the channel
since each antenna chooses what is best for itself. The details
are presented in Algorithm 2.
C. Inversely Proportional to Channel Gain (IPCG) Attack
In contrast to the PCG attack, the adversary allocates more
power to weak channels to compensate for the loss over the
weak channels, i.e., inversely proportional to the channel gain.
The perturbations that are transmitted by each antenna are
generated using the MRPP attack and the power for each
antenna is determined to be inversely proportional to the
channel gain. As in the PCG attack, the IPCG attack can be
also crafted with common target or independent targets for
all antennas. The algorithm is the same as Algorithm 1 for
common target and Algorithm 2 for the independent targets
except that wi changes to be inversely proportional to the
channel, i.e., wi =
1
‖hari‖2
(
1∑m
j=1
‖harj
‖2
) , i = 1, · · · ,m.
D. Elementwise Maximum Channel Gain (EMCG) Attack
Unlike the previous attacks that considered the channel gain
of the channel vector with dimension p×1 as a way to allocate
power among antennas, the adversary in the EMCG attack con-
siders the channel gain of each element of the channel to fully
utilize the channel diversity as shown in Fig. 2(b). First, the
adversary compares the channel gain elementwise and selects
one antenna that has the largest channel gain at each instance.
Algorithm 3: EMCG attack
Inputs: input rtr, desired accuracy εacc, power constraint
Pmax and model of the classifier L(θ, ·, ·)
Initialize: ε← 0C×1, k ← 0p×1, δi ← 0p×1 for ∀i
for i = 1 to p do
hvir,i = max{‖har1,i‖2, · · · , ‖harm,i‖2}
k[i] = argmax{‖har1,i‖2, · · · , ‖harm,i‖2}
end
Virtual channel : Hvir = diag{hvir,1, · · · , hvir,p}
for class-index c in range(C) do
εmax ←
√
Pmax, εmin ← 0
δc =
H
∗
vir∇xL(θ,rtr,y
c)
(‖H∗
vir
∇xL(θ,rtr,yc)‖2)
while εmax − εmin > εacc do
εavg ← (εmax + εmin)/2
xadv ← x− εavgHvirδc
if lˆ(xadv) == ltrue then εmin ← εavg
else εmax ← εavg
end
ε[c] = εmax
end
target = argmin ε, δvir = ε[target]δtarget
for i = 1 to p do
δk[i] = δ
vir [i]
end
Transmit δi, i = 1, · · · ,m
Adversary
f
n
Receiver
(a)
Adversary
f
n
Receiver
(b)
Fig. 2. Illustration of (a) SAGA attack and (b) EMCG attack.
Specifically, the adversary finds and transmits with the antenna
j∗ = argmaxj=1,···m{‖harj,t‖2} that has the largest channel
gain at instance t. Further, a virtual channel hvir,t at instance t
is defined as the channel with the largest channel gain among
antennas. Then, the adversary generates the perturbation δvir
with respect to hvir = [hvir,1, · · · , hvir,p]T using the MRPP
attack and transmits each element of δvir with the antenna
that has been selected previously. The details are presented in
Algorithm 3.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we compare the performances of the attacks
introduced in Section III (along with the MRPP attack from
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Fig. 3. Classifier accuracy with respect to the number of adversaries with
single antenna.
[19] where the adversary has a single antenna) to investigate
how the number of antennas at the adversary affects the attack
performance. Also, multiple adversaries that are each equipped
with a single antenna and located at different positions are
considered to motivate the need to craft attacks for the
adversary with multiple antennas.
To evaluate the performance, we use the VT-CNN2 classifier
from [23] as the modulation classifier (also used in [10],
[19]) where the classifier consists of two convolution layers
and two fully connected layers, and train it with GNU radio
ML dataset RML2016.10a [24]. The dataset contains 220,000
samples where half of the samples are used for training and
the other half are used for testing. Each sample corresponds to
one specific modulation type at a specific signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR). There are 11 modulations which are BPSK, QPSK,
8PSK, QAM16, QAM64, CPFSK, GFSK, PAM4, WBFM,
AM-SSB and AM-DSB. We follow the same setup of [23],
using Keras with TensorFlow backend, where the input sample
to the modulation classifier is 128 I/Q channel symbols.
In the simulations, we introduce the channel between the
ith antenna at the adversary and the receiver as a Rayleigh
fading channel with path-loss and shadowing, i.e., hari,j =
K(d0
d
)γψhi,j where K = 1, d0 = 1, d = 10, γ = 2.7, ψ ∼
Lognormal(0, 8) and hi,j ∼ Rayleigh(0, 1). We assume that
channels between antennas are independent (except for Fig.
6) and fix SNR as 10dB. We evaluate the attack performance
as a function of the perturbation-to-noise ratio (PNR) from
[10]. The PNR represents the relative perturbation power with
respect to the noise power. As the PNR increases, the power
of the perturbation relatively increases compared to the noise
power making the perturbation more likely to be detected by
the receiver since it becomes more distinguishable from noise.
First, we compare the classifier accuracy of an adversary
equipped with a single antenna using the MRPP attack to the
case of multiple adversaries where each adversary has a single
antenna using the MRPP attack. For a fair comparison, total
power that is used among adversaries is kept the same as the
power used by the single adversary and the power is equally
divided among adversaries. Results are shown in Fig. 3. Note
that for the case of two or more adversaries, adversaries are
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−16 −14 −12 −10 −8 −6 −4 −2
PNR [dB]
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 %
EMCG Gau%% an no %e
IPCG  nd.
PCG  nd.
MRPP (m=1)
SAGA
EMCG
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not synchronized and do not collaborate with each other as
they are physically not co-located meaning that they attack
with independent targets. We observe that the accuracy of the
classifier does not drop although more adversaries are used
to attack the classifier. This result suggests that dividing the
power equally is not helpful and thus motivates the need for an
adversary with multiple antennas to choose power allocation
on antennas and exploit the channel diversity.
Adversarial attacks using two antennas with common target
and independent targets are compared in Fig. 4. The PCG
attack outperforms the IPCG attack regardless of whether the
target is common or independent showing that the power
allocation among antennas is important. Also, choosing an
independent target at each antenna performs better than the
common target case for both PCG and IPCG attacks suggest-
ing that choosing the best target (determined by the channel
realization) for each antenna is more effective.
Fig. 5 presents the classifier accuracy at the receiver when
the adversary transmits an adversarial perturbation withm = 2
antennas using different attacks that are introduced in Section
III. The EMCG attack with Gaussian noise transmitted by the
adversary with two antennas is compared with the adversarial
perturbation with two antennas using the MRPP attack at each
antenna. The use of Gaussian noise as perturbation results
in poor attack performance although the EMCG attack is
used to determine the antenna to transmit supporting the
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use of the MRPP attack. Fig. 5 shows that although the
adversary uses two antennas, the accuracy of the classifier is
higher than the case under the MRPP attack of an adversary
with single antenna when the IPCG attack with independent
targets is used. Also, the performance of the PCG attack with
independent targets is similar to the performance of the MRPP
attack of the adversary with a single antenna although the
adversary puts more power to the better channel. We observe
that the SAGA attack slightly outperforms the MRPP attack of
an adversary with a single antenna suggesting that the SAGA
attack takes advantage of having two channels to choose from.
Moreover, the EMCG attack significantly outperforms other
attacks by fully utilizing the channel diversity.
So far, results have been obtained under the assumption
that channels between the antennas are independent, which
also yields zero covariance. Next, we consider correlation
between the channels and we investigate various attacks of an
adversary with two antennas under different covariance levels.
Results are shown in Fig. 6. We observe that as the covariance
between the antennas increases, the performance of the PCG
attack with common target increases significantly where it is
comparable to the SAGA attack and even outperforms the PCG
attack with independent targets. Note that the PCG attack with
independent targets outperforms the PCG attack with common
target when the channels are independent as shown in Fig. 4. In
contrast, we see that other attack schemes are not significantly
affected by the covariance. Further, we observe that even
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if the covariance is increased to 0.7 the attack performance
slightly decreases compared to when the covariance is 0.2 in
the EMCG attack, the PCG attack with independent targets
and the SAGA attack.
Assuming again independent channels from adversary an-
tennas to the receiver, the classifier accuracy is shown in Fig.
7 when we vary the channel variance. The classifier accuracy
drops as the channel variance increases for all cases due to
the increased uncertainty induced by the increased channel
gain from the adversary to the receiver. Further, the perfor-
mance ratio between MRPP and EMCG attacks increases as
the channel variance increases. We also observe that as the
PNR increases, the gap between MRPP and EMCG attacks
decreases except for the case when the channel variance is 1.
Finally, we evaluate the attack performance of the adversary
with different number of antennas m for the EMCG attack.
Results are shown in Fig. 8 when the variance of channels
is 1. The classifier accuracy decreases as m increases due
to the increased channel diversity available to the adversary
to exploit. Moreover, as the PNR increases, the performance
gap between attacks launched with different m decreases
suggesting that an increase of m in the high PNR region is
not as effective as in the low PNR region.
V. CONCLUSION
We considered a wireless communication system where a
DL-based signal classifier is used at the receiver to classify
signals transmitted from the transmitter to their modulation
types and showed that different methods to craft adversarial
perturbations can be used to exploit multiple antennas at the
adversary. We show that just adding more antennas at the ad-
versary does not always increase the attack performance. Thus,
it is important to carefully allocate power among antennas,
determine the adversarial perturbation for each antenna, and
exploit channel diversity to select which antenna to transmit. In
this context, the proposed EMCG attack significantly outper-
forms other attacks and effectively uses multiple antennas to
evade the target classifier over the air. Next, we showed that the
attack performance holds for different conditions of channels
from the adversary antennas to the receiver and significantly
improves by increasing the number antennas at the adversary.
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